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Abstract
This paper introduces a new approach to face capital allocation prob-
lems from the perspective of acceptance sets, by defining the family
of sub-acceptance sets. We study the relations between the notions of
sub-acceptability and acceptability of a risky position as well as their
impact on capital allocation rules; in this context, indeed, capital allo-
cation rules are interpretable as tools for assessing the contribution of
a sub-portfolio to a given portfolio in terms of acceptability instead of
necessarily involving a risk measure. Furthermore, we investigate un-
der which conditions on a capital allocation rule a representation of an
acceptance set holds in terms of the capital allocation rule itself, thus
extending to this setting the interpretation, classical in risk measures
theory, of minimal amount required to hedge a risky position.
Keywords: Capital allocation, acceptance sets, convex risk mea-
sures, quasi-convex risk measures.
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1 Introduction
In the literature, capital allocation problems are classically studied and asso-
ciated to risk measures. Indeed, given a monetary risk measure ρ : L∞ → R,
a capital allocation rule (CAR) is a map Λρ : L
∞ × L∞ → R such that
Λρ(Y ;Y ) = ρ(Y ) for every Y ∈ L∞ (Kalkbrener [16]). Many popular
methods (e.g. Euler's method, Aumann-Shapley allocation (Centrone and
Rosazza Gianin [2], Kalkbrener [16], Tasche [18]), beyond requiring linearity
of Λρ in the first variable, are also such that Λρ(X;Y ) is interpretable as the
risk contribution of a sub-unit X to a position Y .
It is also well known that monetary risk measures are the natural coun-
terpart of acceptance sets (Artzner et al.[1], Föllmer and Schied [13]) hence,
in the classical sense, any capital allocation rule also takes into account the
acceptability of a stand-alone risky position X allocating no positive cap-
ital to acceptable positions. What is instead missing is the consideration
of what happens in terms of acceptability when X is merged into another
position Y and how this possibly affects the allocation of capital. Indeed,
consider a situation where we are provided with a monetary risk measure ρ
that qualifies a position X as non-acceptable. If X is anyway considered as a
sub-portfolio of another position Y , and we look at the marginal contribution
ρY (X) := ρ(Y )− ρ(Y −X), the risk of X can potentially change, and it can
become acceptable w.r.t. the monetary risk measure ρY (·), not contributing
to the risk of Y . We wish thus to rephrase the problem of capital allocation
in a way that takes into account this eventuality, instead of simply sharing
ρ(Y ) among its sub-units. In other words, if we consider a portfolio Y , we
want to define CAR as maps assigning to each sub-portfolio X of Y a capital
that reflects their acceptability as sub-units of Y , and does not necessarily
assign a share Λ(X;Y ) of ρ(Y ).
The capital allocation problem is thus disentangled from the use of risk
measures, and revisited in terms of a different definition and a newly intro-
duced concept, that is, the one of a sub-acceptance family of sets. Under suit-
able assumptions, we derive capital allocation rules reflecting the idea above
starting from acceptance and sub-acceptance sets and, conversely, we show
that capital allocation rules having some natural properties give rise to ac-
ceptance and sub-acceptance sets in terms of which they can be represented,
thus extending to these capital allocation rules the classical interpretation
of capital requirement typical of risk measures. The situation becomes even
more interesting when we consider quasi-convex risk measures, where every
quasi-convex risk measure is associated to a family of acceptance sets and one
speaks of acceptability at different levels. In analogy with what happens with
monetary risk measures, in this case we will need families of sub-acceptance
sets.
To sum up, the main contributions of the paper are the following: firstly,
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we introduce a new approach to capital allocation problems by means of the
concepts of sub-acceptance and acceptance sets. Secondly, under suitable
assumptions, we derive a representation theorem for capital allocation rules
in terms of families of sub-acceptance sets in quite a general (convex, quasi-
convex, S-additive) framework. Finally, we investigate the correspondence
between properties at the level of capital allocation rules and those at the
level of sub-acceptance families.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we recall some standard
notions and results about risk measures, acceptance sets and capital allo-
cation rules. In Section 3 we introduce the notion of sub-acceptance sets,
while in Section 4 we define the notion of risk measure-free capital allocation
rule and prove the main results of the paper. Finally, Section 5 contains
extensions to the S-additive and quasi-convex cases.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we recall the definitions and the results which we are going
to use in the following. Throughout the work, given a probability space
(Ω,F ,P) and a time horizon T , L∞ := L∞(Ω,F ,P) denotes the space of
all P-essentially bounded random variables on (Ω,F ,P). Equalities and in-
equalities have to be understood to hold P-almost surely. A random variable
Y ∈ L∞ will represent the profit and loss at time T of a financial position.
2.1 Risk measures
We firstly recall from Föllmer and Schied [13] the standard definitions of
monetary, convex and coherent risk measures, as well as some key results
about them.
A map ρ : L∞ → R is called a monetary risk measure if it satisfies the
following conditions:
• monotonicity: if X ≤ Y (X,Y ∈ L∞), then ρ(X) ≥ ρ(Y )
• cash-additivity: ρ(X +m) = ρ(X)−m for any m ∈ R and X ∈ L∞.
A monetary risk measure ρ is called normalized if ρ(0) = 0, while convex
if it satisfies:
• convexity: ρ(λX + (1−λ)Y ) ≤ λρ(X) + (1−λ)ρ(Y ) for any λ ∈ [0, 1],
X,Y ∈ L∞.
A convex risk measure ρ is called coherent if it satisfies:
• positive homogeneity: ρ(λX) = λρ(X) for any λ ≥ 0 and X ∈ L∞.
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Positive homogeneity and convexity, together, are equivalent to sub-
additivity: ρ(X + Y ) ≤ ρ(X) + ρ(Y ) for any X,Y ∈ L∞.
Different classes of risk measures generalizing cash-additivity have been
introduced in the literature. In particular, we recall (see Farkas et al. [10]
and Munari [17]) that a risk measure ρ : L∞ → R is called S-additive if it
satisfies monotonicity and
• S-additivity: ρ(X + mST ) = ρ(X) − mS0 for any m ∈ R, S eligible
and X ∈ L∞,
where an eligible asset is a couple S = (S0, ST ) with initial value S0 > 0 and
terminal (random) payoff ST satisfying P(ST ≥ 0) = 1.
Instead, a risk measure ρ is called cash-subadditive (see El Karoui and
Ravanelli [9]) if it satisfies
• cash-subadditivity: ρ(X+m) ≥ ρ(X)−m for any m ≥ 0 and X ∈ L∞.
Notice that both convexity and subadditivity express the idea of diversi-
fication of risk (see Artzner et al. [1], Delbaen [4] and [5], Föllmer and Schied
[12], Frittelli and Rosazza Gianin [15]). As pointed out by Cerreia-Vioglio
et al. [3] (see also Drapeau and Kupper [8], Frittelli and Maggis [14]), once
cash-additivity is dropped the right formulation of diversification is given
by the weaker property of quasi-convexity. This gives rise to the class of
quasi-convex risk measures, that is satisfying monotonicity and
• quasi-convexity: ρ(λX + (1 − λ)Y ) ≤ max{ρ(X), ρ(Y )} for any λ ∈
[0, 1] and X,Y ∈ L∞.
2.2 Risk measures and acceptance sets
We recall (see Farkas et al. [10]) that a subsetA ⊆ L∞ is called an acceptance
set if it is
• non-trivial: ∅ 6= A 6= L∞
• monotone: X ∈ A and Y ≥ X imply Y ∈ A.
Any position X ∈ A is then called acceptable.
It is well known that there exists the following one-to-one correspondence
between monetary risk measures and acceptance sets (see Föllmer and Schied
[13] (Propositions 4.6 and 4.7)). A monetary risk measure ρ induces the
acceptance set of ρ, that is the set
Aρ := {X ∈ L∞ | ρ(X) ≤ 0} (1)
of positions which are acceptable in the sense that they do not require addi-
tional capital. Moreover, ρ can be recovered from Aρ as
ρ(X) = inf{m ∈ R | m+X ∈ Aρ} . (2)
4
A similar result holds also for S-additive risk measures (see [17]). In-
deed, if ρ is a S-additive risk measure then Aρ is non-trivial and monotone.
Moreover, ρ can be recovered from Aρ as
ρ(X) = inf
{
m ∈ R
∣∣∣∣ mS0ST +X ∈ Aρ
}
.
Conversely, given a class A ⊆ L∞ of acceptable positions and an eligible
asset S one can define
ρA,S(X) := inf
{
m ∈ R
∣∣∣∣ mS0ST +X ∈ A
}
.
If A ⊆ L∞ is non-trivial and monotone then ρA,S is a S-additive risk mea-
sure.
The correspondence between acceptance sets and risk measures become
more complex in the quasi-convex case, as we will illustrate in section 5.2.
2.3 Capital allocation rules
We now recall the standard definition of a capital allocation rule.
Definition 1 Given a risk measure ρ, a capital allocation rule (CAR) with
respect to ρ is a map Λρ : L
∞ × L∞ → R such that
Λρ(X;X) = ρ(X) ∀X ∈ L∞.
We refer the reader to Denault [6], Kalkbrener [16], Centrone and Rosazza
Gianin [2] for more details.
Given a generic set of random variables X , we say that X ∈ X is a
sub-portfolio (or sub-unit) of Y ∈ X if there exists Z ∈ X such that Y =
X + Z. Notice that every random variable is a sub-portfolio of any other,
whenever X is a vector space. Since we fix X = L∞ throughout the work,
we simply consider every pair of random variables as a pair of respectively a
sub-portfolio and a portfolio.
It is customary in the literature to assume some properties on capital
allocation rules. We remind some of the most significant (see [16]):
• monotonicity: if Z ≤ X (Z,X ∈ L∞), then Λ(Z;Y ) ≥ Λ(X;Y ) for
any Y ∈ L∞
• no-undercut: Λ(X;Y ) ≤ Λ(X;X) for any X,Y ∈ L∞
• riskless allocation: Λ(a;Y ) = −a for any a ∈ R and Y ∈ L∞.
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Monotonicity means that the capital allocated to a position with a higher
profit and loss has to be less or equal than the capital allocated to another
position with a lower profit and loss. No-undercut property means that the
capital allocated to X considered as a sub-portfolio of Y does not exceed the
capital allocated to X considered as a stand-alone portfolio, that is, when
a risk measure is involved, the risk contribution of X does not exceed its
risk capital. This is a well-known property in standard capital allocation
problems which, together with other ones, is required for a fair (also called
coherent) allocation of risk capital (see Centrone and Rosazza Gianin [2],
Denault [6], Kalkbrener [16]).
3 Acceptance and sub-acceptance sets
In the classical approach to capital allocation, given a position Y and a sub-
portfolio X, Λ(X;Y ) reflects ρ(Y ). However, the capital allocation problem
can be seen from another standpoint, as the following example shows.
Example 2 Suppose we are provided with a monetary risk measure ρ to
quantify the riskiness of financial positions, together with its acceptance set
A. Given a portfolio Y ∈ A we can look for those positions which do not
increment the risk of Y , that is belonging to the set
AY = {X ∈ L∞ | ρ(Y )− ρ(Y −X) ≤ 0} .
Roughly speaking, AY is formed by positions such that the risk of the portfolio
containing the position is at most equal to the risk of the portfolio without
the position.
Note that ρY (·) := ρ(Y )− ρ(Y − ·) is still a monetary risk measure and
evaluates the riskiness of X as a sub-portfolio of Y . In this case, AY can
be viewed as the set of all acceptable positions with respect to ρY , i.e. the
acceptance set of ρY .
Notice that it is possible to find a position Z which is not acceptable but
belongs to AY . A simple example is the following. For the probability space
(Ω = [−1, 1],F = B(Ω),P = λ2 ), where λ is the Lebesgue measure on [−1, 1],
we consider Y = 12 and Z = 1[0,1] − 1[−1,0). Then, for ρ(X) = ess sup(−X)
we have that ρ(Z) = 1. Hence Z /∈ A while
ρ(Y )− ρ(Y − Z) = −1
2
− 1
2
= −1 < 0,
so Z ∈ AY .
The previous example shows that there may exist some positions which
do not contribute to the risk of the portfolio, even if they require extra capital
when considered as stand-alone portfolios. Hence, in that case, ρ provides a
non-correct measure of the risk of the sub-portfolios of Y . It would be more
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suitable, instead, to measure the risk of sub-portfolios by using ρY and not
to allocate any part of the risk capital to those sub-portfolios belonging to
AY . The relevance of this fact and the lack of literature about it lead us to
formalize the idea with the following definition.
Definition 3 Let A be an acceptance set. A family of sets (AY )Y ∈L∞ is
called a sub-acceptance family of A if both the following properties hold:
1. AY is an acceptance set for every Y ∈ L∞
2. A = {Y ∈ L∞ | Y ∈ AY }
Any AY is called sub-acceptance set of Y and any position X ∈ AY is called
sub-acceptable with respect to Y .
Condition 1. of the previous definition means that the positions belonging to
AY are acceptable with respect to a fixed position Y , that is when they are
considered as sub-portfolios of Y . This implies also that the sub-acceptance
criterion, i.e. the one which leads us to detect AY , involves features of both
the position itself and of Y . Condition 2. requires that Y is acceptable if and
only if it belongs to AY , that is it is sub-acceptable with respect to itself.
In the following we provide an example of a sub-acceptance family, point-
ing out that the criterion defining the above family depends also on the fixed
acceptance set A.
Example 4 Consider the acceptance set
A = {Y ∈ L∞ | E[Y ] ≥ 0}
and the following sub-acceptance set
AY = {X ∈ L∞ | E[X + Y ] ≥ 0} ,
for a fixed Y ∈ L∞.
It is easy to check that (AY )Y ∈L∞ is a sub-acceptance family of A.
Suppose now we slightly modify A and consider the acceptance set
A′ = {Y ∈ L∞ | E[Y ] ≥ λ} for some λ > 0.
In this case, (AY )Y ∈L∞ is no more a sub-acceptance family of A′, since
Condition 2. of Definition 3 fails. Indeed,
{Y ∈ L∞ | Y ∈ AY } = {Y ∈ L∞ | E[Y ] ≥ 0} 6= A′.
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4 Risk measure-free capital allocation rules
Acceptance and sub-acceptance sets are tools to detect whether a position
needs to be covered by extra capital or not, both when considered as a
stand-alone portfolio and when considered as a sub-portfolio of another po-
sition. We now provide a tool suitable for assessing the contribution of a
sub-portfolio to a given portfolio in terms of acceptability. As shown in the
previous section, we need to go beyond the standard approach by linking
directly capital allocation rules and (sub-)acceptance sets. To this aim, we
define a map Λ, where Λ(X;Y ) is interpreted as the capital allocated to X
as a sub-portfolio of Y .
Definition 5 A function Λ: L∞ × L∞ → R is called a risk measure-free
capital allocation rule if it satisfies
• 1-cash-additivity: Λ(X+c;Y ) = Λ(X;Y )−c for any c ∈ R and X,Y ∈
L∞
• normalization: Λ(0;Y ) = 0 for any Y ∈ L∞.
When no ambiguity arises we will simply refer to such a map as a capital
allocation rule, while we will speak of ρ-capital allocation rule when we refer
to the classical definition (see definition 1).
1-cash-additivity means that if we add a cash amount c to the sub-
portfolio X, the capital allocated to it decreases exactly of c. Notice that
some known capital allocation rules in the literature satisfy 1-cash additiv-
ity, as for example those based on directional derivatives and extensions (see
Centrone and Rosazza Gianin [2], Denault [6], Kalkbrener [16]).
Normalization property is quite clear: there is no reason to allocate any
capital to a position which yields an almost surely null profit and loss.
Let us now consider the following examples of capital allocation rules
based on two capital allocation methods that are well-known in the classical
approach, that is the marginal method and the proportional method (see
Dhaene et al.[7] and Tasche [18]).
Example 6 Given a monetary normalized risk measure ρ, the marginal
method is given by
ΛMρ (X;Y ) = ρ(Y )− ρ(Y −X), X, Y ∈ L∞,
while the proportional method by
ΛPρ (X;Y ) =
ρ(X)
ρ(X) + ρ(Y −X)ρ(Y ), X, Y ∈ L
∞.
It is easy to check that ΛMρ is a ρ-CAR satisfying normalization and 1-
cash-additivity, since ρ is cash-additive, while ΛPρ is normalized but it is not
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1-cash-additive. Hence ΛPρ is not a risk measure-free capital allocation rule,
despite it is a ρ-capital allocation rule because ΛPρ (X;X) = ρ(X).
The following additional properties will be sometimes required:
• enlargement: if Y˜ ≥ Y (Y, Y˜ ∈ L∞), then Λ(X; Y˜ ) ≤ Λ(X;Y ) for any
X ∈ L∞
• cash-additivity: Λ(Y + c;Y + c) = Λ(Y ;Y ) − c for any c ∈ R and
Y ∈ L∞
Enlargement requires that the risk contribution of X considered as a sub-
portfolio of a portfolio Y is higher than the risk contribution of X when
it is considered as a sub-portfolio of a dominating portfolio Y˜ . In other
words, the greater is the portfolio, the lower are the risk contribution of
the sub-portfolios. While the properties of monotonicity and no-undercut
are well established in the literature, to the best of our knowledge we are
the first to introduce the enlargement property. Note, moreover, that the
cash-additivity property is automatically satisfied in the standard case when
a monetary risk measure is involved, while this does not necessarily hold for
1-cash-additivity.
Although, as we will see in the following, no-undercut and enlargement
can be both used to prove some key results, they are not equivalent as next
example shows.
Example 7 Consider the capital allocation rule given by the marginal method:
Λρ(X;Y ) = ρ(Y )− ρ(Y −X), X, Y ∈ L∞,
for a given monetary risk measure ρ. Then, whenever ρ is also coherent, Λρ
satisfies the no-undercut property, because
Λρ(X;Y ) = ρ(Y )− ρ(Y −X) ≤ ρ(X).
However, it fails to satisfy enlargement. Take indeed the sample space Ω =
{ω1, ω2, ω3} with P(ωi) > 0, for any i = 1, 2, 3 and take the positions
Y = 0, Y˜ =

0, ω1
2, ω2
1, ω3
, Z =

−2, ω1
0, ω2
−1, ω3
and the risk measure ρ(X) = ess sup(−X). Then Y˜ > Y while
Λρ(Z;Y ) = −ρ(−Z) = 0 < Λρ(Z; Y˜ ) = 2.
that is enlargement fails.
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4.1 From acceptance sets to capital allocation rules
We now investigate the connections between capital allocation rules and
acceptance sets. To this aim, take an acceptance set A, a sub-acceptance
family (AY )Y ∈L∞ and define
ΛA(X;Y ) := inf {m ∈ R | m+X ∈ AY } for any X,Y ∈ L∞, (3)
where the subscript A will be omitted when no misunderstandings can arise.
Here, Λ(X;Y ) can be seen as the capital allocated to X, considered as a
sub-portfolio of Y , in terms of the minimum amount of capital which should
be added to X to make it sub-acceptable. Notice that, in general, Λ(Y ;Y )
does not define the minimum amount of capital which should be added to
Y to make it acceptable but only the minimum amount of capital m to
make m+ Y sub-acceptable with respect to AY . However, under additional
conditions on the sub-acceptance family, the previous property is fulfilled.
We introduce now the following definition.
Definition 8 A sub-acceptance family (AY )Y ∈L∞ is said to be translation
invariant if it satisfies:
AY = AY+m for any m ∈ R and Y ∈ L∞.
Translation invariance can be interpreted as follows: no matter if we add
or remove a fixed amount of capital m to the portfolio Y , the sub-acceptable
positions keep being so. This property can be too restrictive, as we are going
to show in the following examples.
Example 9 Consider the set
AY = {X ∈ L∞ | ρ(Y )− ρ(Y −X) ≤ 0} , Y ∈ L∞,
for a given (normalized) monetary risk measure ρ. By cash-additivity of ρ,
it follows that (AY )Y ∈L∞ is translation invariant. Indeed, for any m ∈ R
and Y ∈ L∞ it holds that
AY+m = {X ∈ L∞ | ρ(Y +m)− ρ(Y +m−X) ≤ 0}
= {X ∈ L∞ | ρ(Y )− ρ(Y −X) ≤ 0} = AY .
Example 10 Consider instead
AY = {X ∈ L∞ | E[X + Y ] ≥ 0} , Y ∈ L∞.
It is easy to check that (AY )Y ∈L∞ is not translation invariant. However, the
following inclusions hold for any Y ∈ L∞:
AY+m ⊆ AY if m < 0
AY+m ⊇ AY if m > 0.
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To continue our study, we need to define the following property which an
acceptance set A can fulfill or not:
• no certain losses: inf {m ∈ R | m ∈ A} = 0
No certain losses property means that the smallest constant random variable
which is acceptable is 0, i.e. no positions with a (certain) negative profit and
loss can be acceptable. We will show in the following that no certain losses
is strictly related to the normalization property of a capital allocation rule.
We are now ready to state a result generalizing the one true for risk
measures; see Section 2 or, for more details, Föllmer and Schied [13, Prop.
4.7].
Proposition 11 If A is an acceptance set, (AY )Y ∈L∞ is a sub-acceptance
family and they both satisfy no certain losses property, then Λ defined in (3)
is a monotone capital allocation rule.
Moreover, if the sub-acceptance family is also translation invariant then
Λ(Y ;Y ) = inf {m ∈ R | m+ Y ∈ A} , for anyY ∈ L∞.
Proof. Finiteness of Λ(X;Y ): by the essential boundedness of X and the
monotonicity of AY it holds that
{m ∈ R | m+X ∈ AY } ⊇ {m ∈ R | m+ ess inf X ∈ AY } 6= ∅.
No certain losses implies that Λ(X;Y ) < +∞.
Moreover, by similar arguments,
Λ(X;Y ) ≥ inf {m ∈ R | m+ ess supX ∈ AY } = − ess supX > −∞
by essential boundedness of X, monotonicity of AY and no certain losses of
AY .
1-cash-additivity: for any X,Y ∈ L∞ and c ∈ R it holds that
Λ(X + c;Y ) = inf {m ∈ R | m+X + c ∈ AY }
= inf {k ∈ R | k +X ∈ AY } − c
= Λ(X;Y )− c
by taking k = m+ c.
Normalization: no certain losses of AY implies that
Λ(0;Y ) = inf {m ∈ R | m ∈ AY } = 0 for any Y ∈ L∞.
Monotonicity: fix Y ∈ L∞ and consider Z ≥ X (with Z,X ∈ L∞). By
monotonicity of AY ,
{m ∈ R | m+ Z ∈ AY } ⊇ {m ∈ R | m+X ∈ AY } ,
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hence Λ(Z;Y ) ≤ Λ(X;Y ).
It remains to prove the last statement. For any Y ∈ L∞ it holds that
Λ(Y ;Y ) = inf {m ∈ R | m+ Y ∈ AY }
= inf {m ∈ R | m+ Y ∈ AY+m}
= inf {m ∈ R | m+ Y ∈ A} ,
where the second equality holds by translation invariance and the last one
by definition of sub-acceptance family.
Remark 12 Notice that, when the sub-acceptance family is translation in-
variant, Λ(Y ;Y ) defines exactly the minimum amount of capital which should
be added to Y to make it acceptable, even if the acceptance set A is not in-
volved in the definition of Λ.
We will give now some examples of capital allocation rules associated to
the acceptance and sub-acceptance sets presented in the previous section.
Example 13 Consider the acceptance set and the sub-acceptance family
given by
A = {X ∈ L∞ | ρ(X) ≤ 0}
AY = {X ∈ L∞ | ρ(Y )− ρ(Y −X) ≤ 0}
for a given monetary risk measure ρ and Y ∈ L∞. By cash-additivity of ρ,
ΛA defined in (3) becomes
ΛA(X;Y ) = inf {m ∈ R | m+X ∈ AY }
= inf {m ∈ R | ρ(Y )− ρ(Y − (X +m)) ≤ 0}
= inf {m ∈ R | ρ(Y )− ρ(Y −X) ≤ m}
= ρ(Y )− ρ(Y −X),
hence corresponding to the so-called marginal method; see, among others,
Dhaene et al. [7] and Tasche [18].
Moreover, ΛA is a capital allocation rule. Indeed, 1-cash-additivity is
immediate and normalization follows by no certain losses property of AY .
Furthermore, ΛA(Y ;Y ) = ρ(Y ) because of translation invariance of AY .
Example 14 Consider now the acceptance set and the sub-acceptance family
given by
A = {Y ∈ L∞ | P(Y ≤ 0) ≤ α}
AY = {X ∈ L∞ | P(X + Y ≤ 0) ≤ α}
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for some α ∈ (0, 1) and for any Y ∈ L∞. Then
ΛA(X;Y ) = inf {m ∈ R | m+X ∈ AY }
= inf {m ∈ R | P(X +m+ Y ≤ 0) ≤ α}
= − sup {k ∈ R | P(X + Y ≤ k) ≤ α}
= −q+α (X + Y ) = V aRα(X + Y ),
where q+α (Z) := inf {m ∈ R | P(Z ≤ m) > α} and V aRα(Z) stands for the
Value at Risk at level α of Z. Hence, ΛA is 1-cash-additive but not normal-
ized, so ΛA is not a capital allocation rule. Moreover,
ΛA(Y ;Y ) = −2q+α (Y ) 6= inf {m ∈ R | m+ Y ∈ A} = −q+α (Y )
Indeed, the sub-acceptance family is not translation invariant.
To end this section, in the following we define some properties on accep-
tance sets corresponding to those already introduced on capital allocation
rules.
First of all, it may be reasonable to require that any acceptable positions
is also sub-acceptable for every portfolio. That is,
• A-no-undercut: A ⊆ AY ∀Y ∈ L∞
As shown in the following result, A-no-undercut corresponds to no-undercut
of the associated Λ.
Proposition 15 Let A be an acceptance set and let (AY )Y ∈L∞ be a transla-
tion invariant sub-acceptance family. If (AY )Y ∈L∞ satisfies A-no-undercut,
then ΛA defined in (3) satisfies no-undercut.
Proof. Given arbitrary X,Y ∈ L∞, A-no-undercut implies
{m ∈ R | m+X ∈ A} ⊆ {m ∈ R | m+X ∈ AY } .
Hence,
ΛA(X;Y ) ≤ inf {m ∈ R | m+X ∈ A} = ΛA(X;X)
where the last equality holds by translation invariance of the sub-acceptance
family.
We investigate now which conditions on a sub-acceptance family imply
the enlargement property of the induced capital allocation rule. To this goal,
we introduce the following property:
• A-enlargement: if Y˜ ≥ Y (Y, Y˜ ∈ L∞), then AY ⊆ AY˜ .
In other words, A-enlargement requires that any sub-acceptable position
with respect to a portfolio Y is also sub-acceptable for any portfolio Y˜ ≥
Y , that is dominating Y . The following result shows that A-enlargement
guarantees enlargement of the corresponding capital allocation rule.
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Proposition 16 Let (AY )Y ∈L∞ be a sub-acceptance family. If (AY )Y ∈L∞
satisfies A-enlargement, then ΛA defined as in (3) satisfies enlargement.
Proof. Take any Y˜ , Y ∈ L∞ such that Y˜ ≥ Y . A-enlargement implies then
{m ∈ R | m+X ∈ AY } ⊆
{
m ∈ R ∣∣ m+X ∈ A
Y˜
}
,
therefore
ΛA(X; Y˜ ) = inf
{
m ∈ R ∣∣ m+X ∈ A
Y˜
} ≤ inf {m ∈ R | m+X ∈ AY } = ΛA(X;Y ).
4.2 From capital allocation rules to acceptance sets
So far, we have defined a capital allocation rule starting from an acceptance
set and a sub-acceptance family and studied some properties of that cap-
ital allocation rule corresponding to those required for the sets. We now
investigate the converse.
Let us start with the case when Λ is a CAR which also satisfies the
standard definition, that is induced by a monetary risk measure ρ such that
Λ(X;X) = ρ(X) for any X ∈ L∞.
Consider the acceptance setA of ρ (that isA = {X ∈ L∞ |Λ(X;X) ≤ 0})
and set, for any Y ∈ L∞,
AY := {X ∈ L∞| Λ(X;Y ) ≤ 0} .
Every position X in AY is sub-acceptable in the sense that it does not
need any capital injection when seen as a sub-portfolio of Y . Notice that
A = {Y ∈ L∞ |Y ∈ AY }.
The following representation result is then straightforward.
Proposition 17 If Λ is a capital allocation rule induced by a monetary risk
measure ρ, then
Λ(X;Y ) = inf{m ∈ R |m+X ∈ AY }, Λ(Y ;Y ) = inf{m ∈ R |m+ Y ∈ A}
for any X,Y ∈ L∞.
If, moreover, Λ is monotone, then AY is an acceptance set for any Y ∈
L∞, and Λ(·;Y ) = ρY (·) is a monetary risk measure satisfying ρY (Y ) =
ρ(Y ).
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Proof. If Λ is a capital allocation rule then, by 1-cash-additivity of Λ,
inf{m ∈ R |m+X ∈ AY } = inf{m ∈ R |Λ(m+X;Y ) ≤ 0} = Λ(X;Y )
for any X,Y ∈ L∞.
Moreover, Λ(Y ;Y ) = ρ(Y ) = inf{m ∈ R |m+X ∈ A}, where the former
equality holds since Λ is induced by ρ, the latter from the relation between
monetary risk measures and acceptance sets. If Λ is monotone, monotonicity
of each AY follows from monotonicity of Λ.
The modified monetary risk measure ρY reflects the true risk of X as
a sub-portfolio of Y . It is true that this capital allocation rule is not linear
in general, but this is justified by the fact that we are not trying to share
the risk ρ(Y ) among the various sub-units of Y but to reward each sub-unit
exactly with its risk contribution as a sub-unit of Y .
We now investigate if the previous representation result still holds true
for a general Λ not necessarily induced by a monetary risk measure. Unfor-
tunately, this is not the case without imposing some additional properties
on the capital allocation rule. The main problems are related to the lack of
cash-additivity and to monotonicity which are instead automatically fulfilled
in the standard framework, whenever a monotone risk measure is involved.
There are several ways to fill those lacks: in the following, we will discuss and
investigate the different properties to be required to obtain results similar to
Proposition 17.
Given a risk measure-free capital allocation rule Λ (capital allocation rule
in the following), we define the following sets:
AΛ := {Y ∈ L∞| Λ(Y ;Y ) ≤ 0} (4)
AY,Λ := {X ∈ L∞| Λ(X;Y ) ≤ 0} , Y ∈ L∞, (5)
where the subscript Λ will be omitted when it is clear which capital allocation
is involved.
Proposition 18 If Λ is a capital allocation rule satisfying monotonicity,
cash-additivity and no-undercut, then A defined in (4) is an acceptance set
and (AY )Y ∈L∞ given by (5) is a sub-acceptance family with respect to A.
Moreover, Λ can be written as:
Λ(X;Y ) =
{
inf {m ∈ R | m+X ∈ AY } , if X 6= Y
inf {m ∈ R | m+ Y ∈ A} , if X = Y (6)
Proof. Non triviality of A: first of all, A 6= ∅ since 0 ∈ A by normalization.
In order to check A 6= L∞ let us consider c < Λ(Y ;Y ). Then, by cash-
additivity of Λ, Λ(Y + c;Y + c) = Λ(Y ;Y ) − c > 0 so that Y + c /∈ A. A
similar argument clearly holds for each AY .
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Monotonicity of each AY : considerX ∈ AY and Z ≥ X with Z,X ∈ L∞.
Then, by monotonicity of Λ and (5), it follows that
Λ(Z;Y ) ≤ Λ(X;Y ) ≤ 0,
hence Z ∈ AY .
Monotonicity of A: take X ∈ A and Y ≥ X. Then
Λ(Y ;Y ) ≤ Λ(X;Y ) ≤ Λ(X;X) ≤ 0 (7)
where the first inequality holds by monotonicity of Λ, the second one by
no-undercut and the last one because X ∈ A. Therefore, Y ∈ A and A is
an acceptance set. Since
A = {Y ∈ L∞ | Y ∈ AY } = {Y ∈ L∞ | Λ(Y ;Y ) ≤ 0} ,
then (AY )Y ∈L∞ is a sub-acceptance family with respect to A.
It remains to show that Λ can be represented as in (6). Consider, firstly,
the case where X 6= Y . Then
Λ(X;Y ) = inf {m ∈ R | Λ(X;Y ) ≤ m}
= inf {m ∈ R | Λ(X +m;Y ) ≤ 0}
= inf {m ∈ R | X +m ∈ AY }
where the second equality holds by 1-cash-additivity of Λ and the last one
by definition of AY . Finally, by cash-additivity of Λ and by definition of A,
it follows that
Λ(Y ;Y ) = inf {m ∈ R | Λ(Y ;Y ) ≤ m}
= inf {m ∈ R | Λ(Y +m;Y +m) ≤ 0}
= inf {m ∈ R | Y +m ∈ A}
holds for any Y ∈ L∞. This concludes the proof.
As already mentioned, other (sets of) properties on a capital allocation
rule could guarantee the same thesis of the previous result. Monotonicity is
clearly needed to prove that eachAY is monotone and there are no significant
alternatives, while no-undercut can be replaced by enlargement. Replacing
no-undercut with enlargement impacts just on proving that A is monotone,
in particular inequalities of (7) still hold but thanks to the enlargement.
Notice that either no-undercut or enlargement are required to fill the lack of
the following property:
• full monotonicity: if Y ≥ X (Y,X ∈ L∞), then Λ(Y ;Y ) ≤ Λ(X;X).
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The previous property is automatically satisfied in the standard framework
when Λ is induced by a monotone risk measure. However, full monotonic-
ity follows from either monotonicity and no-undercut or monotonicity and
enlargement, as we can see from inequalities in (7), even if no-undercut and
enlargement are not equivalent conditions.
Notice, moreover, that Λ satisfying no-undercut does not imply the same
property on acceptance and sub-acceptance sets.
5 Some extensions
So far, we focused on the cash-additive case, that is related to a 1-cash-
additive CAR or to a translation invariance sub-acceptance family. In the
following, we generalize the approach above to the case where translation
invariance of the acceptance family either holds with respect to a reference
asset (not necessarily a risk-free asset) or is dropped. More precisely, we will
focus both on the S-additive case and on the quasi-convex case.
5.1 S-additivity
As pointed out by Farkas et al. [10] and Munari [17], the idea of the milestone
work of Artzner et al. [1] is to measure the risk of a position by describing how
close or how far from acceptance a position is, given a reference instrument
that does not necessarily correspond to a cash account. In our framework,
capital allocation rules assess the capital to be allocated to a sub-portfolio by
means of the distance to a sub-acceptance set, which is, in some cases, related
to the risk of the sub-portfolio. Therefore, in general, it is too restrictive to
impose the cash-additivity assumption to capital allocation rules. Following
the approach of Farkas et al. [10] and Munari [17] who introduced the
so-called S-additive risk measures, we would like to admit the possibility to
make a portfolio acceptable or sub-acceptable by adding not necessarily cash
but also shares of a suitable asset.
Fix now a time horizon T and an asset S given by S = (S0, ST ), where
S0 ∈ R is the initial value and ST ∈ L∞ is the value of S at time T . We
assume the existence of a financial market where assets are traded. We recall
the following definition to clarify which are the suitable assets we wish to
add to sub-portfolios in order to reach acceptability.
Definition 19 (see Farkas and Smirnow [11]) Given a time horizon T ≥ 0
and an acceptance set A, an asset S = (S0, ST ) is called eligible if ST ∈ A
and its initial value S0 is strictly positive.
In the following, S will denote, with an abuse of notation, both the asset
and its terminal value ST , while E will denote the set of all eligible assets.
The previous definition slightly differs from the one of Farkas et al. [10]
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where they require the same condition on S0 but a different one on ST , i.e.
P(ST > 0) = 1.
Our aim is now to investigate whether the results of the previous section
can be generalized to the present case where we introduce the following
definition of S-capital allocation rules.
Definition 20 A function Λ: L∞ × L∞ → R is called S-capital allocation
rule if it satisfies
• 1-S-additivity:
Λ(X +mS;Y ) = Λ(X;Y )−mS0 for any m ∈ R, S ∈ E , X, Y ∈ L∞
• normalization: Λ(0;Y ) = 0 for any Y ∈ L∞
Compared to capital allocation rules of Definition 5, in S-capital allocation
rules the assumption of 1-cash-additivity has been replaced by 1-S-additivity.
Similarly to the previous section, given an acceptance set A and a sub-
acceptance family (AY )Y ∈L∞ we define
ΛA(X;Y ) := inf
{
m ∈ R
∣∣∣∣ mS0S +X ∈ AY
}
foranyX, Y ∈ L∞, (8)
where the subscript A will be omitted when no misunderstandings can arise.
Before going further, we need to define the following notions for a sub-
acceptance family.
Definition 21 A sub-acceptance family (AY )Y ∈L∞ is said to satisfy:
• S-translation invariance if AY = AY+mS for any m ∈ R and S ∈ E;
• S-no certain losses if inf
{
m ∈ R
∣∣∣∣ mS0S ∈ A
}
= 0 for any S ∈ E.
S-translation invariance property means that those positions which are
sub-acceptable with respect to a given portfolio Y are also sub-acceptable
with respect to any sum Y +mS where S is eligible andm is any cash amount.
In other words, no matter if we add or remove any quantity (even negative)
of eligible asset S to the portfolio Y , the sub-acceptable positions keep being
so. S-no certain losses property, instead, requires that the smallest share of
eligible asset which is acceptable is 0, i.e. no short positions on S can be
acceptable.
Proposition 22 If A is an acceptance set, (AY )Y ∈L∞ is a sub-acceptance
family and they both satisfy no certain losses property, then ΛA defined in
(8) is a monotone S-capital allocation rule.
Moreover, if the sub-acceptance family is also S-translation invariant then
ΛA(Y ;Y ) = inf
{
m ∈ R
∣∣∣∣ mS0S + Y ∈ A
}
for any Y ∈ L∞.
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Proof. Finiteness of ΛA(X;Y ): since AY is an acceptance set (hence it is
monotone and AY 6= ∅, L∞) and X ∈ L∞,{
m ∈ R
∣∣∣∣ mS0S +X ∈ AY
}
6= ∅,R.
Hence ΛA(X;Y ) ∈ R.
1-S-additivity: for any X,Y ∈ L∞, S eligible and k ∈ R we consider
ΛA(X + kS;Y ) = inf
{
m ∈ R
∣∣∣∣ mS0S +X + kS ∈ AY
}
= inf {(c− k)S0 ∈ R | cS +X ∈ AY }
= inf {cS0 ∈ R | cS +X ∈ AY } − kS0
= inf
{
β ∈ R
∣∣∣∣ βS0S +X ∈ AY
}
− kS0
= ΛA(X;Y )− kS0.
Normalization: S-no certain losses implies, for every Y , that
ΛA(0;Y ) = inf
{
m ∈ R
∣∣∣∣ mS0S ∈ AY
}
= 0.
Monotonicity: fix any X,Y ∈ L∞ and consider Z ≥ X. By monotonicity of
AY , {
m ∈ R
∣∣∣∣ mS0S + Z ∈ AY
}
⊇
{
m ∈ R
∣∣∣∣ mS0S +X ∈ AY
}
hence ΛA(Z;Y ) ≤ ΛA(X;Y ).
Finally, by S-translation invariance of AY and by definition of sub-
acceptance family it follows that for any Y ∈ L∞
ΛA(Y ;Y ) = inf
{
m ∈ R
∣∣∣∣ mS0S + Y ∈ AY
}
= inf
{
m ∈ R
∣∣∣∣ mS0S + Y ∈ AY+ mS0 S
}
= inf
{
m ∈ R
∣∣∣∣ mS0S + Y ∈ A
}
.
Assume now that an S-capital allocation rule Λ is given. We can wonder
which properties are fulfilled by the acceptance sets induced by Λ. To this
aim, we introduce the following property:
• S-additivity:
Λ(Y +mS;Y +mS) = Λ(Y ;Y )−mS0 for any m ∈ R, S ∈ E , Y ∈ L∞
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generalizing cash-additivity of Λ.
Proposition 23 If Λ is a S-capital allocation rule satisfying monotonicity,
S-additivity and no-undercut, then the corresponding A and (AY )Y ∈L∞ are,
respectively, an acceptance set and a sub-acceptance family with respect to
A. Moreover, Λ is given by
Λ(X;Y ) =

inf
{
m ∈ R
∣∣∣∣ mS0S +X ∈ AY
}
, if X 6= Y
inf
{
m ∈ R
∣∣∣∣ mS0S + Y ∈ A
}
, if X = Y
(9)
Proof. A 6= ∅, L∞: 0 ∈ A by normalization of Λ. Given an arbitrary
S ∈ E there exists m ∈ R such that mS0 < Λ(Y ;Y ). S-additivity implies
then
Λ(Y +mS;Y +mS) = Λ(Y ;Y )−mS0 > 0,
hence Y +mS /∈ A. Non triviality of any AY can be checked similarly.
Monotonicity of each AY : consider X ∈ AY and Z ≥ X. Then, by
monotonicity of Λ,
Λ(Z;Y ) ≤ Λ(X;Y ) ≤ 0.
Hence Z ∈ AY .
Monotonicity of A: take X ∈ A and Y ≥ X then, by monotonicity and
no-undercut of Λ,
Λ(Y ;Y ) ≤ Λ(X;Y ) ≤ Λ(X;X) ≤ 0
where the last inequality is due to X ∈ A.
Therefore Y ∈ A and A is an acceptance set. Since
A = {Y ∈ L∞ | Y ∈ AY } = {Y ∈ L∞ | Λ(Y ;Y ) ≤ 0} ,
(AY )Y ∈L∞ is a sub-acceptance family with respect to A.
It remains to show that Λ can be represented as in (9). For any X,Y ∈
L∞ with X 6= Y it holds that
Λ(X;Y ) = inf {m ∈ R | Λ(X;Y ) ≤ m}
= inf
{
m ∈ R
∣∣∣∣ Λ(X + mS0S;Y
)
≤ 0
}
= inf
{
m ∈ R
∣∣∣∣ X + mS0S ∈ AY
}
,
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where the second equality holds by 1-S-additivity and the last one by defi-
nition of AY . Finally, by S-additivity, it follows that, for any Y ∈ L∞,
Λ(Y ;Y ) = inf {m ∈ R | Λ(Y ;Y ) ≤ m}
= inf
{
m ∈ R
∣∣∣∣ Λ(Y + mS0S;Y + mS0S
)
≤ 0
}
= inf
{
m ∈ R
∣∣∣∣ Y + mS0S ∈ A
}
.
This concludes the proof.
Notice that when the only eligible asset is the risk-free asset with ST =
S0, the previous results reduce to Proposition 11 and to Proposition 18,
respectively.
5.2 Quasi-convex case
Consider now the case of families of sub-acceptance sets in quite a general
framework. This is in line with the approach of quasi-convex risk measures
where no cash-additivity is assumed on the risk measure and, consequently,
neither on the family of acceptance sets. See Cerreia-Vioglio et al. [3],
Drapeau and Kupper [8] and Frittelli and Maggis [14] for a detailed treatment
on quasi-convex risk measures. As pointed out in Drapeau and Kupper
[8], in the case of quasi-convex risk measures the one-to-one correspondence
between risk measures and acceptance sets (2) is no more true but has to be
formulated in terms of acceptance sets at different levels. Differently from
the cash-additive case where only the set at level 0 is relevant since all the
other sets can be obtained from it by translation invariance, in the quasi-
convex case the whole family of acceptance sets at different levels is needed.
Consider now a family (AY,m)Y ∈L∞,m∈R of sub-acceptance sets at differ-
ent levels m ∈ R, that is
• for any fixed Y ∈ L∞, (AY,m)m∈R is a family of acceptance sets at
the level m; that is, every AY,m is an acceptance set parametrized by
m ∈ R;
• for any fixed m ∈ R, (AY,m)Y ∈L∞ is a monotone sub-acceptance fam-
ily with respect to an acceptance set Am . More precisely, AY,m is
monotone increasing in Y ∈ L∞.
Roughly speaking, the level m ∈ R can be seen as a degree of acceptability.
Define now
ΛA(X;Y ) := inf{m ∈ R |X ∈ AY,m }, for any X,Y ∈ L∞. (10)
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Proposition 24 Let (AY,m)Y ∈L∞,m∈R be a family of sub-acceptance sets at
the level m ∈ R.
Then ΛA defined in (10) satisfies the following properties:
(a) decreasing monotonicity in X ∈ L∞;
(b) decreasing monotonicity in Y ∈ L∞;
(c) normalization whenever 0 ∈ AY,0 and 0 /∈ AY,m for any m < 0.
Furthermore,
(d) if any AY,m is convex, then ΛA is quasi-convex in the first variable;
(e) if AY,m ⊆ AY,m+c + c for any m ∈ R, c ≥ 0 and Y ∈ L∞, then ΛA is
cash-subadditive in the first variable;
(f) if AY,m = AY,m+c + c for any m, c ∈ R and Y ∈ L∞, then ΛA is 1-cash-
additive.
Proof. (a) Take any Z ≥ X. By monotonicity of AY,m, it follows that
ΛA(X;Y ) = inf{m ∈ R |X ∈ AY,m } ≥ inf{m ∈ R |Z ∈ AY,m } = ΛA(Z;Y ).
Similarly, (b) follows by monotonicity of AY,m in Y .
(c) is immediate.
The proofs of (d) and (e) are similar to those in Drapeau and Kupper
[8]. We include them for reader's convenience.
(d) Let α ∈ [0, 1] andX,Y, Z ∈ L∞ be arbitrarily fixed. Assume now that
X,Z ∈ AY,m¯ for some m¯ ∈ R. It follows then that ΛA(X;Y ),ΛA(Z;Y ) ≤ m¯
and, by convexity of AY,m¯, that also αX + (1− α)Z ∈ AY,m¯. Consequently,
ΛA(αX + (1− α)Z;Y ) ≤ m¯. By a well-known result on quasi-convex func-
tionals, it follows that ΛA(·;Y ) is quasi-convex for any Y ∈ L∞.
(e) For any m ∈ R, c ≥ 0 and X,Y ∈ L∞ it holds that
ΛA(X + c;Y ) = inf{m ∈ R |X + c ∈ AY,m }
≥ inf{m ∈ R |X + c ∈ (AY,m+c + c)}
= inf{m ∈ R |X ∈ AY,m+c }
= inf{m ∈ R |X ∈ AY,m } − c
= ΛA(X;Y )− c,
where the inequality above is due to the assumption AY,m ⊆ AY,m+c + c for
c ≤ 0.
(f) can be proved similarly to item (e).
Notice that, thanks to the previous result, it holds that ΛA(X + c;Y ) ≤
ΛA(X;Y ) for any c ≥ 0 and X,Y ∈ L∞ (by monotonicity in the first vari-
able). Moreover, normalization and cash-subadditivity (whenever satisfied)
imply that ΛA(c;Y ) ≥ −c for any c ≥ 0 and Y , while ΛA(c;Y ) ≤ −c for any
c < 0 and Y .
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So far, we have defined a capital allocation rule starting from a family of
sub-acceptance sets at different levels. We are now going to investigate the
converse.
Consider now a capital allocation rule Λ(X;Y ) not necessarily satisfying
cash-additivity.
Define now
AY,m := {X |Λ(X;Y ) ≤ m} and Am := {Y |Λ(Y ;Y ) ≤ m} (11)
for any m ∈ R and Y ∈ L∞.
Proposition 25 If Λ is a monotone capital allocation rule, then the corre-
sponding AY,m and Am defined as in (11) satisfy the following properties:
(i) for any fixed m ∈ R: (AY,m)Y ∈ L∞, is a sub-acceptance family of
Am = {Y : Y ∈ AY,m};
(ii) for any fixed Y ∈ L∞:
(a) AY,m is monotone for every m ∈ R;
(b) AY,m is monotone in m ∈ R w.r.t. set inclusion;
(c) AY,m is convex whenever Λ(X;Y ) is quasi-convex in X ∈ L∞.
Proof.
(i) We start to prove the properties once m ∈ R is fixed arbitrarily. We
have only to check the first statement since the second is immediate. AY,m 6=
∅ follows immediately by the assumptions on Λ implying that −m ∈ AY,m
for any m ∈ R (since, by 1-cash-additivity, Λ(m;Y ) = Λ(0;Y )−m = −m).
AY,m 6= L∞: again by the assumptions on Λ it follows that −m¯ /∈ AY,m for
any m¯ > m, hence the thesis.
(ii) Let now Y ∈ L∞ be fixed and let m ∈ R be arbitrary.
(a) Assume that X ∈ AY,m and Z ≥ X. By monotonicity of Λ in the
first variable, it follows that Λ(Z;Y ) ≤ Λ(X;Y ) ≤ m. Hence, Z ∈ AY,m.
(b) and (c) follow immediately by the definition of AY,m in (11).
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